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VISUAL  SIMILARITY  IN  MASKING 
AND PRIMING: THE CRITICAL ROLE 
OF TASK RELEVANCE
Visual  backward  masking  is  the  modern  method  of 
choice for studying the time-course of object percep-
tion in conscious experience (Enns & Di Lollo, 2000; 
Kim  &  Blake,  2005),  and  masked  forward  priming 
is the comparable tool for studying the unconscious 
processes involved in response preparation (Ansorge & 
Neumann, 2005; Klotz & Neumann, 1999). In a typi-
cal masking experiment, participants try to identify a 
briefly flashed image (called a target) that is followed 
closely in time and space by a second image (called a 
mask). If the mask resembles the target and appears 
very soon after it, the target can be difficult to see, 
sometimes to the point of being invisible. By studying 
the relationship between target visibility and the time 
that elapses before the mask appears, the time-course 
of object perception can be inferred (Bachmann & Allik, 
1976; Enns, 2004). 
A typical masked priming experiment involves the 
same stimulus sequence of two displays in rapid se-
quence. The only difference is that participants are now 
asked to respond as rapidly as possible to the identity 
of the mask. The briefly flashed display that appears 
just prior to this visible mask is now called the prime. 
A prime can have a strong influence on the speed with 
which the mask is identified, even when the prime is 
invisible to participants, speeding responses when it 
resembles  the  visible  mask  and  slowing  responses 
AbSTRACT
Cognitive scientists use rapid image sequences 
to study both the emergence of conscious per-
ception  (visual  masking)  and  the  unconscious 
processes  involved  in  response  preparation 
(masked priming). The present study asked two 
questions:  (1)  Does  image  similarity  influence 
masking and priming in the same way? (2) Are 
similarity effects in both tasks governed by the 
extent of feature overlap in the images or only 
by  task-relevant  features?  Participants  in  Ex-
periment 1 classified human faces using a single 
dimension even though the faces varied in three 
dimensions (emotion, race, sex). Abstract geo-
metric shapes and colors were tested in the same 
way in Experiment 2. Results showed that simi-
larity reduced the visibility of the target in the 
masking task and increased response speed in 
the priming task, pointing to a double-dissocia-
tion between the two tasks. Results also showed 
that only task-relevant (not objective) similarity 
influenced  masking  and  priming,  implying  that 
both tasks are influenced from the beginning by 
intentions of the participant. These findings are 
interpreted within the framework of a reentrant 
theory of visual perception. They imply that in-
tentions can influence object formation prior to 
the separation of vision for perception and vision 
for action.
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when  it  resembles  a  mask  mapped  to  an  alternate 
response.  Examining  the  effectiveness  of  various 
primes allows researchers to infer the content of the 
representations used to identify the masks (Ansorge 
& Neumann, 2005; Beitmeyer, Öğmen, & Chen, 2004; 
Klotz & Neumann, 1999).
A fundamental question that remains unanswered 
is “To what extent do these two tasks rely on the same 
underlying mental processes?” That is, are the proc-
esses leading to conscious perception of the target the 
same ones that lead to priming in mask identification? 
The existing evidence is mixed on this question. On 
the one hand, some display factors seem to have the 
same  direction  of  influence  on  both  tasks,  pointing 
to  an  underlying  unity.  For  example,  increasing  the 
temporal interval between the first and second display 
increases both the visibility of the first display and the 
magnitude of the priming that occurs in identifying the 
second display (Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, 
& Schwarzbach, 2003). Increasing the luminance con-
trast of the first display has a similar effect on both 
tasks, improving the visibility of the first display and 
increasing  the  priming  effect  on  the  second  display 
(Brietmeyer, Öğmen, Ramon, & Chen, 2005). 
But the influences of other factors seem to disso-
ciate the two tasks, pointing to separate neural systems 
responsible for the visibility of the first display and its 
priming effect on identifying the second display. For 
example, in many cases brief displays that cannot be 
discriminated above chance levels, and are therefore 
not even visible, still produce strong priming effects 
(Lleras & Enns, 2004; Vorberg et al, 2003). Some re-
ports even claim that priming is strongest when the 
first display is never seen (Brietmeyer et al., 2005; 
Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002). 
Finally, the role played by perceptual similarity of the 
two displays appears to have opposite effects in the 
two tasks, with increased display similarity generally 
reducing first display visibility (see Breitmeyer, 1984, 
for a review) while at the same time increasing the 
priming  effect  for  the  second  display  (Ellis,  Young, 
Flude, & Hay, 1987). However, to our knowledge the 
role of display similarity in the two tasks has never 
been compared directly in the same study.
Our first goal in this study was to examine the in-
fluence of image similarity in these two tasks, using 
precisely the same display conditions and the same 
participants  in  both  tasks.  Finding  evidence  that 
similarity plays an opposite role in the performance of 
these two tasks would then constitute strong evidence 
for a double dissociation, consistent with unique neural 
systems underlying these two tasks.
Our  second  goal  was  to  determine  whether  the 
similarity effects in backward masking and masked 
priming  were  tied  to  physically  defined  features  of 
the  images  or  whether  only  task-relevant  features 
participated in the similarity effects. This is an im-
portant question because the answer speaks to the 
levels of processing that are involved in both mask-
ing and priming. For instance, some theories propose 
that masking occurs at relatively early and low-levels 
of  neural  representation,  prior  to  stages  of  visual 
processing during which the participant’s goals and in-
tentions can have an influence on perception (Keysers 
& Perrett, 2002; Scheerer, 1973; Turvey, 1973). In 
the priming literature, some have also proposed that 
primes exert their influence independent of the goals 
and  intentions  of  the  participants  (Jonides,  1981; 
Posner,  1980;  Theeuwes,  1992,  1996;  Winkielman, 
Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005). If this is the case, for 
either masking or priming, then these tasks should be 
influenced by the physically defined similarity of the 
first and second display. That is, the effect of display 
similarity  on  masking  and  on  priming  should  grow 
directly with the number and similarity of shared fea-
tures in the two displays.
A REENTRANT THEORY OF  
PERCEPTION
In contrast to the view that masking and priming are 
encapsulated from the intentions of the participant, 
our research has focused recently on the roles played 
by participants’ goals and their intended actions on 
the very earliest representations formed in the mi-
crogenesis of perception. Our ideas along these lines 
were first developed in studies of visual masking (Di 
Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Enns & Di Lollo, 1997), 
but we have since applied them to studies of masked 
priming (Lleras & Enns, 2004; 2005; 2006), change 
blindness (Austen & Enns, 2000, 2003), the atten-
tional blink (Di Lollo et al, 2005; Kawahara, Enns, & 
Di Lollo, 2003), the flash-lag illusion (Moore & Enns, 
2004) and interrupted visual search (Lleras, Rensink, 
& Enns, 2005). In brief, visual perception is consid-
ered to be an iterative process whereby information is 
analyzed at several levels, most notably a higher level 
associated  with  object  representations  and  a  lower 
level  associated  with  pre-categorical  sensory  input. 
Perceptual awareness is achieved once a “perceptual 
hypothesis” about a candidate object is created and 
confirmed by testing it against the current sensory 
input. Importantly, observers do not become aware 
of perceptual hypotheses that fail to be confirmed, Task relevance in masking and priming
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which can happen when sensory information regard-
ing the initial item is no longer present in the visual 
system, as is the case in visual backward masking.
According to this theory, the task of reporting the 
identity of the first of two images in a rapid sequence 
of displays will be influenced by somewhat different 
factors than the requirement to respond as rapidly as 
possible to the second of two images in the sequence. 
Consider first the case of a participant trying to iden-
tify the first image (i.e., a standard prime identifica-
tion task). The participant must first form or activate 
a hypothesis about the image and then confirm that 
hypothesis by testing it against the available sensory 
evidence, before they are able to report on its identity. 
If the display changes before they have had the op-
portunity to confirm their initial hypothesis, there will 
be a mismatch between the hypothesis (based on the 
prime) and the new sensory information (the changed 
image). The system will have to be reset and a new 
hypothesis will be initiated, based on this new image. 
This is the account of the reentrant theory for success-
ful backward masking of an image. Critically, because 
conscious awareness of an image is required as part 
of the task, a perceptual match must be established 
and  this  requires  not  only  a  feed-forward  sweep  of 
processing  but  also  at  least  one  feedback  phase  of 
processing. 
Next,  consider  the  case  of  a  participant  prepared 
to  respond  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the  identity  of 
the second image (i.e., a standard mask identification 
task). In this case, information regarding the various 
response  alternatives  can  be  sampled  more  or  less 
continuously until enough evidence has accumulated to 
warrant committing to a response. There is no require-
ment that the sensory evidence must result in explicit 
perceptual awareness before a response can be made; 
only that there is sufficient sensory evidence to initi-
ate one response rather than the other. Presentation 
of  the  prime  will  activate  its  associated  response, 
whether conscious awareness of the prime follows or 
not  (Cressman,  Franks,  Enns,  &  Chua,  2007;  Lleras 
& Enns, 2006). If a second image maps to the same 
response, the evidence required for responding will ac-
cumulate to threshold faster than if the second image 
maps to a different response and the accumulation of 
evidence for the correct response must start over. The 
participant in a mask identification task will, of course, 
try to ignore the information entering the system from 
the first display, but to the extent that the first image is 
in the same location, and/or is difficult to discriminate 
from the second image in time, and/or shares visual 
features with masks assigned to the response classes, 
it will be difficult to disentangle the processing arising 
from the first image and forward response priming will 
ensue  (Huber,  Shiffrin,  Lyle,  &  Ruys,  2001;  Lleras  & 
Enns, 2004; Weidemann, Huber, & Shiffrin, 2005). 
As this brief summary makes clear, according to the 
reentrant theory of perception, for both kinds of tasks 
(prime and mask identification) information relevant 
to responding to either image is being sampled for a 
period of time that extends beyond the brief presenta-
tion of the image. Ordinarily, when perceiving dynamic 
events in natural settings, such temporal overlap in 
neural activity from discrete events helps the system 
to bridge brief gaps in input (Di Lollo, 1980) and to 
interpret distinct physical events in nearby locations as 
the same object moving or changing its appearance, 
a bias we refer to as object-updating (Enns, Lleras, 
& Moore, in press). In the artificial setting of the lab, 
however,  where  the  participant  is  asked  to  respond 
selectively to the components of dynamic sequences, 
these processes favoring object continuity can lead to 
confusion. Moreover, this confusion is intensified when 
the task requires discriminating sensory evidence that 
arises  from  the  prime  versus  a  mask  that  is  highly 
similar (as in a prime identification task). In the mask 
classification  task,  discriminating  the  source  of  the 
sensory evidence is less important than determining 
whether there is more of it in support of one response 
or another. Thus, confusion arises in mask classification 
when the sources of sensory evidence suggest conflict-
ing responses; by the same token, facilitation results 
when both sources point to the same response. 
According  to  the  reentrant  theory,  both  of  these 
tasks can also be influenced by the intentions of the 
participant. If the participant is able to form a well-de-
fined expectation of the target or class of target objects 
that are likely to appear prior to the onset of a display, 
then the process of hypothesis activation should take 
less time than if there is less certainty about the im-
ages that will be displayed (Di Lollo et al., 2000). Thus, 
for both prime and mask identification, performance 
should be strongly influenced by the degree to which 
the participant has been able to form a well-defined 
task template or filter for the anticipated display prior 
to its onset. By the same token, task-relevant features 
should be more likely than task-irrelevant features to 
influence performance in both tasks, especially if the 
participant can restrict processing to a narrow range 
of hypotheses. 
This aspect of the reentrant theory is consistent with 
research from many other studies showing that percep-
tion is strongly influenced by expectations. For exam-
ple, participants anticipating change in the identity of a 214
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face are faster to detect those changes than changes in 
emotional expression. Conversely, participants expect-
ing changes in emotional expression are faster to detect 
those than changes in identity (Austen & Enns, 2003). 
Similarly, search for a target in a display that is periodi-
cally interrupted is not adversely affected by changes in 
target features that are irrelevant to the target detection 
response;  changes  to  response-relevant  features,  on 
the other hand, slow down search significantly (Lleras, 
Rensink, & Enns, in press). Computational models of 
expectation effects have even been developed to ac-
count for the behavior of single cells in the striate cor-
tex (Bridgeman, 1993). 
To summarize, the identification of the first or the 
second of two images in a rapid sequence are both 
predicted by reentrant theory to be influenced by fac-
tors that bias the perception of a single object in a 
dynamic sequence and by factors that influence the 
range  of  possible  perceptual  hypotheses  in  a  task. 
What is critically different in the requirements of the 
two tasks is that prime identification cannot occur be-
fore a successful match has been established between 
the feedback sweep of activity generated by an object 
hypothesis  and  the  currently-available  feed-forward 
sensory evidence (i.e., conscious awareness is a pre-
requisite for making a response). Mask identification, 
on the other hand, can occur without the need for a 
match, that is, it can proceed without the requirement 
of a feedback sweep of activity to fully confirm a par-
ticular hypothesis in the current sensory activity.
OVERVIEW OF STUDY
If similarity effects in either visual masking or masked 
priming tasks are determined mainly by the goal-di-
rected intentions of the participant, it would be strong 
evidence against the idea that these phenomena are 
complete at early levels of representation, that is, at 
levels encapsulated from the effects of goal-directed 
perception.  In  Experiment  1  we  tested  this  idea  by 
presenting  pictures  of  human  faces  to  participants 
in  both  a  masking  and  a  priming  task.  These  were 
faces  of  many  different  individuals  and  they  varied 
systematically in the emotions portrayed (either anger 
or  happiness),  in  the  race  of  the  individuals  (either 
Asian or Caucasian), and in their sex (either female or 
male). However, each participant classified the faces 
in  both  tasks  using  only  one  of  these three dimen-
sions (emotion, race, or sex). The results showed that 
similarity effects in masking were restricted to task-
relevant features and that masks with similar task-rel-
evant features reduced the visibility of the target face. 
The similarity effects in priming were also restricted to 
task-relevant features, but in this case these similar 
task-relevant features increased the speed with which 
the mask could be correctly classified.
The  perception  of  human  faces  may  be  unique, 
either  because  of  their  biologically  privileged  status 
or  because  of  a  lifetime  of  acquired  expertise.  In 
Experiment 2 we therefore used a similar design, but 
tested the masking and priming of geometric shapes 
and colors to see if our findings generalized beyond 
faces. The results we obtained were substantially the 
same as in Experiment 1. 
These experiments provide clear answers to our two 
questions. First, there is a double dissociation between 
masking and priming with regard to the influence of dis-
play similarity: similar masks are most effective in reduc-
ing target visibility in a masking task and similar primes 
are most effective in increasing the speed of responses 
to visible masks. This finding is consistent with unique 
neural systems underlying these two tasks. Second, it is 
task-relevant features and not the total number of shared 
features that govern the similarity effects in both mask-
ing and priming. This finding strongly suggests that the 
representations involved in these two tasks are influenced 
from the earliest stages by the goals of the participant. 
EXPERIMENT 1: FACES VARYING IN 
EMOTION, RACE, AND SEX
Method
Participants
Forty-eight  undergraduates  from  the  University 
of British Columbia participated in a 1-hr session in 
return for partial course credit. Participants were as-
signed  to  one  of  three  Relevant  Feature  conditions 
(emotion, race, sex). All participants reported normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision.
Displays and apparatus
Displays were controlled by an eMac computer and 
presented  centrally  on  a  17-inch  CRT  monitor  at  a 
viewing distance of approximately 50 cm (screen reso-
lution 1024 x 768 pixels, 256 levels of gray, 89 Hz). 
There were a total of 16 different images of individual 
faces:  2  emotions  (angry,  happy)  x  2  races  (Asian, 
Caucasian) x 2 sexes (female, male) x 2 exemplars 
(person 1, person 2). Images were selected from the 
JACFEE set by Matsumoto and Ekman (1988). Images 
were 7.5 cm square (245 pixels per side), which cor-
responded to 8.6 degrees of visual angle per side. The 
background  screen  was  an  intermediate  gray  (50% 
intensity, 30 cd/m2) and the luminance of the faces Task relevance in masking and priming
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ranged from a low of 10 cd/m2 (black hair regions) to 
a high of 90 cd/m2 (white skin regions).
Each trial consisted of the following display sequence 
as shown in Figure 1: a prime face was presented for 
22  ms,  followed  by  a  blank  gray  interval  of  0,  22, 
or 45 ms, and then a mask face was presented for   
504 ms. Response feedback was given for both tasks 
in the form of a plus sign (correct response), minus 
sign  (incorrect  response)  or  circle  (no  response)  at 
the center of the screen, and remained on view for   
1.5 s. This also served as the fixation point and warn-
ing symbol for the start of the next trial, which began   
0.5 s after the feedback symbol was erased. Participants 
were given 2 s to make a response. 
Procedure
Each participant first performed the speeded RT task 
of classifying the mask face according to the relevant 
feature they had been assigned (i.e., emotion, race, 
or sex), before performing the task of identifying the 
prime face according to the same feature. In the mask 
classification task, participants were told that ½ of the 
faces would be of each response type (i.e., angry or 
happy, Asian or Caucasian, female or male) but that 
they would be presented in random order. Participants 
were given printed and verbal instructions, before be-
ginning a practice block of 10 trials. A testing session 
consisted of four blocks of 90 trials (360 trials in total). 
At the end of each block, a dialogue box on the screen 
indicated the error rate, and a warning message was 
presented  if  errors  exceeded  5%.  Participants  were 
instructed to slow down on the next block if this warn-
ing message was presented. Response time (RT) was 
measured in milliseconds (ms).
In the prime classification task the display sequences 
and  instructions  were  the  same  except  that  now  the 
participant was asked to classify the relevant feature of 
the prime face. Here only accuracy was recorded as the 
dependent measure and participants were told to guess if 
they were uncertain about the identity of the prime face.
Results
Speeded task classification
Participants were very accurate overall (mean accu-
racy exceeded 95% in each group) and mean correct 
response  time  (RT)  in  milliseconds  (ms)  is  shown  in 
Figure 2. The left hand column of this figure shows RT 
when features of the prime and mask are matching or 
mismatching on the relevant features of the task; the 
right hand column shows RT when prime and mask are 
matching or mismatching on irrelevant features.
RT priming was influenced much more by the rele-
vant than by the irrelevant features of the task. An 
analysis  of  variance  (ANOVA)  comparing  RT  for  the 
three relevant features (left column in Figure 2) indi-
cated that although there were no group differences in 
overall RT, F(2, 45) = 1.10, p = .35, MSe = 25392.60, 
matching  features  resulted  in  significantly  shorter 
RT  than  mismatching  features,  F(1,  45)  =  103.92,   
p  =  .001, MSe  =  733.49,  and  this  positive  priming 
effect was larger for the features of race and sex than 
for emotion, F(2, 45) = 3.67, p = .04, MSe = 733.49. 
Moreover,  the  positive  priming  effect  increased 
with  prime-mask  interval  for  all  relevant  features,   
F(2,  90)  =  6.48,  p  =  .01,  MSe  =  501.61,  averag-
ing 21 ms when the prime-mask onset interval was   
22 ms and increasing to 46 ms when the interval was 
Figure 1.
(A) Illustration of the display sequences in Experiment 1. In 
the mask classification task participants indicated as rap-
idly as possible either the emotion (angry, happy), the race 
(Asian, Caucasian) or the sex (female, male) of the mask 
face.  In  the  prime  classification  task,  participants  made 
these same judgments of the prime face as accurately as 
possible. (B) Examples of the faces used in Experiment 1.
Prime 22 ms
Blank 0, 22, 44 ms
Mask 500 ms
A
B
emotion
sex
race216
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67 ms in duration. This increase in positive priming 
with interval did not vary between groups of partici-
pants, F(4, 90) = 0.53, p = .71, MSe = 501.61.
An identical ANOVA comparing RT for the irrelevant 
features (right column in Figure 2) indicated a much 
smaller positive priming effect for the same sensory 
features of the faces when they were not related to 
the task of the participant, F(1, 45) = 8.88, p = .01, 
MSe = 210.26. This effect averaged only 5 ms and 
it did not vary significantly with the prime-mask in-
terval, F(2, 90) = 0.07, p = .93, MSe = 248.13, or 
with  participant  group,  F(4,  90)  =  2.58,  p  =  .09,   
MSe = 210.26. An ANOVA including feature relevance 
as a factor (comparing the left and right columns in 
Figure 2) indicated a significant 3-way interaction of 
Group x Relevance x Feature Matching, F(2, 45) = 4.64, 
p = .02, MSe = 381.02.
Prime classification accuracy
Figure 3 shows accuracy in the prime classification 
task separately for task relevant (left column) and ir-
relevant features (right column). The dashed line at an 
accuracy of .50 indicates the chance level of guessing 
in this two-alternative forced choice task.
The visibility of the prime face was influenced much 
more  by  the  relations  between  the  features  of  the 
prime and mask when the features were relevant to 
the discrimination being made. An ANOVA comparing 
accuracy for the three relevant features (left column 
in  Figure  3)  indicated  that  accuracy  was  generally 
higher for the sex group (mean = .70) than the race 
group (mean = .67) or the emotion group (mean = .59), 
F(2,  45)  =  9.80,  p  =  .001,  MSe  =  .032,  and  that   
accuracy  increased  along  with  prime-mask  interval,   
F(2, 90) = 121.40, p = .001, MSe = .004. Prime ac-
curacy was also much lower when the mask features 
matched  those  of  the  prime  than  when  they  mis-
matched, F(1, 45) = 18.34, p = .001, MSe = .042. 
This effect of feature similarity on prime visibility was 
greater for the race group (mean difference = .206) 
than for the emotion group (mean difference = .074) 
and the sex group (mean difference = .034) and it in-
creased significantly with prime-mask interval only in 
the sex group, F(2, 30) = 10.47, p = .01, MSe = .003.
The  same  ANOVA  comparing  accuracy  for  the  ir-
relevant features (right column in Figure 3) indicated 
that  whether  or  not  the  features  of  the  prime  and 
mask matched one another had no influence on prime 
face visibility, F(1, 45) = 0.35, p = .56, MSe = .002.   
An  ANOVA  including  feature  relevance  as  a  factor 
(comparing  the left and right columns in Figure 3) 
indicated  a  significant  3-way  interaction  of  Group  x 
Relevance x Feature Matching, F(2, 45) = 5.16, p = .01,   
MSe = .021.
Relations between tasks
The relations between performance on these two 
tasks was examined in several ways. First, the correla-
tion between prime visibility (indexed by mean prime 
classification  accuracy)  and  mask  identification  (in-
dexed by mask classification RT) was not significant,   
n = 36, r = -.15, p = .37, suggesting that there was no 
direct link between prime visibility and the overall speed 
of mask processing. Yet, there were some factors that 
seemed to be related to performance in both tasks, 
including the processing time given exclusively to the 
prime (prime-mask interval), the extent to which the 
prime was visible (mean prime classification accuracy) 
and whether the prime and mask shared task-relevant 
features (mean difference between mismatching and 
matching  relevant  features).  In  this  section  we  will 
consider each of these factors in turn.
Increasing  prime  processing  time  (the  prime-
mask interval) resulted in increases in prime visibil-
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Figure 2.
Mean correct RT in the mask face classification task. Fea-
ture match and feature mismatch refers to the relation be-
tween  the  prime  and  the  mask  faces.  Relevant  features 
are those used explicitly by the participant to classify the 
faces; irrelevant features are those that vary to the same 
degree but are not the basis for the classification. Error bar 
represents one standard error of the mean (SE).Task relevance in masking and priming
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ity, but it had no direct effect on the speed of mask 
identification.  Instead,  longer  prime  processing 
reduced RT on feature-matching masks and length-
ened RT on feature-mismatching masks. This leads 
to the hypothesis that longer prime processing time 
increases mask priming effects. However, this same 
variable did not increase the feature-relevant visi-
bility effects in the prime detection task. As such, it 
appears that prime processing time influences both 
tasks (prime visibility and mask identification) but 
not in the same way.
One possibility worth exploring is that it is not the 
relationship between prime visibility and mask classifi-
cation speed that is the important one, but rather the 
relationship between prime visibility and the net prim-
ing  effect  (RT  difference  between  mismatching  and 
matching trials). Examining this relationship, we find 
that increasing the processing time always increased 
the size of the priming effect for task relevant features. 
Considered on its own, this relationship suggests that 
prime  visibility  is  directly  related  to  response  prim-
ing, speeding responses when there is a match and 
slowing it on a mismatch. But what this construal fails 
to explain is why the same magnitude of increase in 
processing time has no consequence when the match-
ing-mismatching features are task-irrelevant (the right 
column of Figures 2 and 3). 
Examining possible links between the tasks on the 
basis of prime visibility also seemed to have mixed ef-
fects, i.e., it depended on the factor used to alter prime 
visibility. On the one hand, increasing prime visibility 
by  increasing  the  prime-mask  interval  led  to  larger 
priming effects, as already described, but increasing 
prime visibility by using a mask with mismatching rel-
evant features led to a lengthening rather than to a 
shortening of the time needed to identify the mask. 
So, prime visibility is also not a factor that permits 
a unified understanding of prime visibility and mask 
identification speed. With regard to this issue, we note 
that several recent reports have claimed that primes 
that are processed exclusively at an unconscious level 
(i.e., that are effective as primes but invisible to the 
participant) result in response inhibition in a subse-
quent  identification  task  involving  similar  features 
(Schlaghecken  &  Eimer,  2002,  2006).  Conversely, 
primes that are perceived with awareness are thought 
to result in response activation. Directly relevant to this 
hypothesis, three conditions in the present experiment 
yielded prime accuracy levels that did not differ signifi-
cantly from chance and therefore met a strict criterion 
for unconscious priming (feature matching conditions 
for emotion and race in Figure 3, left column). Yet, all 
three of these conditions resulted in strong positive 
priming in the mask identification task. As such, there 
was no support for prime visibility as a factor that uni-
fies our understanding of these two tasks. 
Task-relevant feature similarity was directly related 
to performance in each of these tasks, but the direc-
tion of influence was opposite in the two tasks. Similar 
relevant features in prime and mask reduced prime 
visibility (prime accuracy) whereas the same similar 
features  increased  the  speed  with  which  the  mask 
could be identified. Task-relevant feature similarity is 
thus a factor that doubly dissociates the task of prime 
identification from that of mask identification.
Discussion
This study clearly shows a double dissociation be-
tween  the  effects  of  image  similarity  on  a  visual 
masking task and a masked priming task. This oc-
curred even though the only differences in the two 
tasks concerned the question posed to participants; 
identical image sequences were presented in each 
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task.  When  participants  tried  to  classify  the  face 
in the first display (masking task), similar faces in 
the second display were most effective in reducing 
target visibility. Conversely when participants tried 
to classify the face in the second display (priming 
task), similar faces in the first display were most ef-
fective in increasing the speed of classification. This 
is consistent with unique neural mechanisms in the 
two tasks.
The second important finding was that task-relevant 
features (not objective number of shared featues) gov-
erned the similarity effects in both tasks. This finding 
strongly suggests that the representations involved in 
these two tasks are influenced from the earliest stages 
by the goals of the participant. 
We will have more to say about both of these find-
ings  in  the  General  Discussion.  However,  it  is  first 
important  to  determine  whether  these  results  are 
peculiar  to  faces  as  images,  or  perhaps  peculiar  to 
backward masking involving overlapping patterns, or 
whether  these  results  hold  true  more  generally  for 
other stimuli and other forms of backward masking. 
Faces may be treated as a special class of objects by 
the visual system for a number of reasons, including 
(1) their importance as meaningful signals of social-
emotional-biological information, (2) the high degree 
of  expertise  that  participants  have  acquired  about 
faces over a lifetime of experience, or (3) the rela-
tional or configurational aspects of face processing. We 
also acknowledge that backward pattern masking also 
often gives rise to fundamentally different results than 
other forms of masking, such as simultaneous mask-
ing and metacontrast masking (Enns, 2004; Enns &   
Di Lollo, 2000).
In  the  next  experiment  we  used  a  very  similar 
experimental  design,  but  instead  of  using  faces  as 
images, we used geometric shapes and colors as the 
features that could vary between images in the two 
displays.  Also,  instead  of  using  pattern  masking  (in 
which the two images overlap one another in space) 
we used metacontrast masking, in which the contours 
of the first image fit snugly against, but do not touch, 
the contours of the second image.
EXPERIMENT 2: GEOMETRIC 
SHAPES VARYING IN SHAPE AND 
COLOR
Method
Thirty-six  participants  from  the  same  pool  as 
Experiment 1 were assigned to one of two Relevant 
Feature conditions (shape, color). Participants in the 
shape group first classified the second image as either 
a square or a diamond in the first half of the testing 
session (priming task) before classifying the first im-
age as either a square or a diamond in the second 
half  (masking  task).  Participants  in  the  color  group 
performed the same task using the same displays, but 
instead  classified  the  images  in  each  task  as  either 
blue or red. The prime and mask stimuli are shown in 
Figure 4.
There  were  a  total  of  4  different  images  used  in 
first displays: 2 shapes (diamond, square) x 2 colors 
(blue, red). First display images were 0.9 cm per side 
(30 pixels). There were also 4 different second dis-
play images that were 1.8 cm per (60 pixels) side and 
contained a star-shaped hole that contained each of 
the first display images when they were overlaid. The 
color blue was composed of RGB values 0-0-100 and 
the red was composed of RGB values of 100-0-0. The 
background screen was white (RGB 100-100-100).
Trial  sequences  and  procedures  were  otherwise 
identical to Experiment 1. In the mask classification 
task, participants were told that ½ of the shapes would 
be  of  each  response  type  (i.e.,  diamond  or  square; 
blue or red) but that they would be presented in ran-
dom order.
Figure 4.
Illustration of the shapes and colors used in Experiment 2.
masks
primesTask relevance in masking and priming
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Results
Speeded task classification
Participants were very accurate in this experiment 
(mean  accuracy  exceeded  94%  in  each  group)  and 
mean correct RT is shown in Figure 5. The results were 
very similar to those for faces in Experiment 1, with 
a match between relevant features in the prime and 
mask resulting in positive RT priming, but not a match 
between irrelevant features.
ANOVA  indicated  that  the  color  of  the  mask  was 
responded  to  more  quickly  overall  than  the  shape 
of  the  mask,  and  this  effect  approached  signifi-
cance  F(1,  34)  =  3.88,  p  =  .06,  MSe  =  21694.70. 
With  regard  to  priming,  matching  relevant  features 
resulted  in  significantly  shorter  RT  than  mismatch-
ing  relevant  features,  F(1,  34)  =  37.96,  p  =  .001,   
MSe  =  4317.88,  and  this  positive  priming  effect 
was larger for color than for shape, F(1, 34) = 8.58,   
p  =  .01,  MSe  =  4317.88.  The  prime-mask  interval 
had  no  significant  effect  in  this  task  with  one  ex-
ception  that  was  marginally  significant:  when  color 
was  the  relevant  feature  (lower  left  panel  in  Figure 
4) RT increased with interval for mismatching colors 
and  decreased  with  interval  for  matching  colors,   
F(2, 68) = 2.97, p = .06, MSe = 1492.85. The ANOVA 
comparing RT for the irrelevant features (right column 
in Figure 4) indicated no other significant differences, 
all Fs < 1.13. An ANOVA including feature relevance 
as a factor (comparing the left and right columns in 
Figure 5) indicated a 2-way interaction of Relevance 
x  Feature  Matching,  F(1,  34)  =  17.17,  p  =  .001,   
MSe = 2059.17.
Prime classification accuracy
Figure 6 shows accuracy in the prime classification   
task for geometric shapes and colors. The dashed line at 
an accuracy of .50 indicates the chance level of guessing 
in the task. As was true for faces, the visibility of the prime 
was influenced by features it shared with the mask only 
when the features were relevant to the discrimination 
being made (left column in Figure 6). ANOVA indicated 
that accuracy was generally higher for color (mean = .75) 
than for shape (mean = .58), F(1, 34) = 42.87, p = .001,   
MSe = .029. Prime accuracy was lower when the mask 
features  matched  those  of  the  prime  than  when  they 
mismatched, F(1, 34) = 32.32, p = .001, MSe = .019. 
The  prime  mask  interval  did  not  have  a  significant  in-
fluence,  either  as  a  main  effect  or  in  an  interaction,   
Fs < 2.27, ps > .11.
The ANOVA comparing accuracy for the irrelevant 
features  (right  column  in  Figure  6)  indicated  that 
whether or not the features of the prime and mask 
matched one another had no influence on prime face 
visibility, F(1, 34) = 1.05, p = .32, MSe = .006. An 
ANOVA including feature relevance as a factor (com-
paring the left and right columns in Figure 5) indicated 
a significant 2-way interaction of Relevance x Feature 
Matching, F(1, 34) = 17.03, p = .001, MSe = .015.
Relations between tasks
The relations between the two tasks were exam-
ined in the same way as the previous experiment with 
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faces. The overall correlation between prime accuracy 
and mask identification speed was again not signifi-
cant, n = 24, r = -.282, p = .18, consistent with there 
being no simple relationship between prime visibility 
and the speed of mask processing. 
Increasing the prime-mask interval in this experi-
ment had no general effect on prime visibility or on 
the speed of mask identification. However, as in the 
previous experiment, longer prime processing time re-
duced RT on feature-matching masks and lengthened 
RT  on  feature-mismatching  masks.  Varying  prime 
visibility also led to mixed effects: Increasing prime 
visibility by lengthening the prime-mask interval led 
to  larger  priming  effects,  but  increasing  it  by  using 
a  mask  with  mismatching  relevant  features  led  to 
longer mean RT. With regard to unconscious priming, 
the three matching conditions for the shape group in 
the feature-relevant prime detection task did not differ 
significantly from chance (Figure 6, upper left panel) 
and yet these conditions led to strong positive prim-
ing in the mask identification task. And once again, 
task-relevant feature similarity had opposite directions 
of influence (i.e., led to a double dissociation) in the 
two tasks. The same relevant features reduced prime 
accuracy but increased the speed with which the mask 
could be identified. 
Discussion
These results with geometric shapes and colors (rather 
than faces), using a metacontrast masking procedure 
(rather than pattern masking), yielded essentially the 
same results with regard to our two main questions. 
First,  image  similarity  reduced  first-image  visibility 
(masking task) and increased the speed of second-im-
age classification (priming task). Second, the effect of 
similarity was significant only for image features that 
were relevant to the task being undertaken by the par-
ticipant; equally large variations in the same features 
had no effect when those features were irrelevant to 
the goals of the participant.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
These  experiments  are  clear  in  providing  evidence 
for: (1) A double dissociation in the effects of image 
similarity on a backward masking task and a masked 
priming task. Similar images were most effective in 
reducing target visibility in the masking task, as well 
as being most effective in increasing the speed of re-
sponses to visible masks. (2) Task-relevant similarity 
(not  objective  similarity)  governed  the  similarity  ef-
fects in both the masking and the priming task. The 
same physical features can therefore either influence 
masking and priming or not, depending on which fea-
tures are relevant to the classification task the par-
ticipant is actively engaged in. In this section we will 
discuss the theoretical implication of these two main 
findings in turn.
One general point that should be made first, how-
ever, is to acknowledge that there were masking ef-
fects in these experiments that were independent of 
the effects of the prime-mask similarity that were the 
focus of this study. That is, image similarity does not 
account for all the effects of prime visibility, nor pre-
sumably for all of the effects of priming on the task of 
rapidly classifying the mask image. There are other 
factors involved, including image contrast and the time 
between prime and mask. Therefore, bear in mind in 
the following discussion that we do not deny the im-
portance of these factors. Rather, we will focus on the 
role that  image similarity plays  in  addition  to these 
other factors.
A second general question that should be addressed 
concerns whether the accuracy levels reported in the 
prime  classification  task  of  each  experiment  were 
contaminated  by  response  bias  effects  (as  opposed 
to being measures of what participants really expe-
rienced). Such a bias could come about, for example, 
if participants had a tendency to report the prime as 
“opposite  to  the  visible  mask”  whenever  they  were 
uncertain  about  the  prime’s  identity  (see  Vorberg, 
Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2004, for 
a method that is sometimes appropriate for ruling out 
effects of response bias, but that cannot be applied 
here because it requires averaging over the matching 
and mismatching conditions). 
We believe there are several reasons why a response 
bias explanation is insufficient to account for all of the 
similarity  effects  in  the  prime  visibility  results.  First, 
participants  are  told  that  the  primes  they  are  trying 
to classify consist equally of one type versus the other 
(e.g., equally angry versus happy in the emotion-rel-
evant condition) and so there is no a priori reason we 
know of to select one bias (i.e., when uncertain, re-
spond “opposite” to visible mask) over another (i.e., 
when uncertain, respond “same” as visible mask). At 
the same time, our theoretical perspective of reentrant 
processing provides plenty of motivation for predicting 
that perception will be biased by prime-mask similarity 
in this way. Second, there is a large and longstanding 
literature documenting that similar masks are more ef-
fective than dissimilar masks in reducing the visibility 
of a prime stimulus, even when response bias is not an 
issue because the measure of visibility is unrelated to Task relevance in masking and priming
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the nature of the mask (Breitmeyer, 1984). Third, to the 
extent that there is a bias to respond “opposite” when 
uncertain  in  the  present  data,  such  an  effect  should 
reduce in size as the certainty of what is seen is in-
creased (i.e., as the interval between prime and mask is 
increased). With increased visibility, any guessing strat-
egy would be diminished. Yet the data show that the 
similarity effects on prime visibility, if anything, increase 
along with visibility; they are not decreased as predicted 
by this particular response bias interpretation.
Unique neural systems involved in 
masking and priming
Ever since Fehrer and Raab’s (1962) report that simple 
RT to the onset of a metacontrast-masked target is un-
affected by its visibility, vision researchers have been 
intrigued by the possibility that some visually guided 
actions can be accomplished without any accompany-
ing awareness of the target shape that is responsible 
for  the  guided  action.  Since  then,  dissociations  be-
tween conscious awareness and visually guided action 
have been studied in the literatures of visual geometric 
illusions (Carey, 2001), metacontrast masking of shape 
(Klotz & Neumann, 1999) and color (Schmidt, 2002), 
and the spatial location of targets in visually guided 
pointing  (Chua  &  Enns,  2005;  Goodale,  Pelisson,  & 
Prablanc, 1986) and grasping (Castiello, 1996; Ganel 
& Goodale, 2003). However, very little attention has 
been given to the role played by visual similarity in the 
two tasks that have been dissociated in these studies. 
The present study suggests that any theory of this dis-
sociation must account for both the opposite direction 
that the influence of image similarity has on masking 
and priming tasks as well as for the finding that only 
task-relevant features have an influence on these simi-
larity-based effects.
From the perspective of the theoretical frameworks 
that are most commonly used to understand the disso-
ciation in masking and priming, there is little reason to 
suppose that stimulus similarity should influence con-
scious perception and unconscious response priming in 
the same way (i.e., that only task relevant features play 
a role), and there is even less reason to suspect that 
these effects should be in opposite directions in the two 
tasks. For instance, within the direct parameter speci-
fication (DPS) theory of Neumann (1990), it is possible 
for participants to create a direct link between sensory 
information  and  the  response  parameters  concern-
ing when and how to respond. Once these are set up, 
they do not require mediation by conscious processes. 
A response is simply activated if the sensory activity 
contains features relevant to making a given response. 
Thus, within the DPS framework, where conscious and 
unconscious visual processes are considered separately, 
there is no expectation that the rules of visual similarity 
would be akin but opposite in their influence when two 
consciously perceived objects are similar.
Like DPS, the dual visual systems theory of Milner and 
Goodale (1995) is premised on different neural systems 
underlying unconscious, visually guided action and the 
conscious perception of objects and scenes. As such 
there is no built in expectation that similarity should 
influence each system in the same way. If anything, 
different rules governing similarity might be expected. 
This is because visually guided action is accomplished 
by the so-called dorsal visual stream, which extends 
from area V1 into the parietal lobe, whereas conscious 
perception resides in the so-called ventral stream that 
extends  from  area  V1  into  the  temporal  lobe.  The 
dorsal  stream  is  believed  to  be  relatively  color-blind 
and dominated by the fast-acting, magnocellular neu-
ral pathway that is sensitive to depth perception and 
motion. Most importantly for the guidance of actions, 
its spatial frame of reference is egocentric (from the 
perspective of the actor). The ventral stream, on the 
other hand, is believed to have relatively higher spatial 
acuity, to be color sensitive, and to represent objects in 
an allocentric frame of reference (from the perspective 
of the object). Thus, in this theory, there is also no 
reason to expect the rules of similarity for masking and 
priming should be so closely related to one another and 
yet opposite in their direction of influence.
The reentrant theory of perception summarized in 
the introduction (Di Lollo et al, 2000; Enns et al, in 
press; Lleras & Enns, 2004) provides a different per-
spective on the dissociation observed for the effects of 
similarity. At the heart of this theory is the view that 
visual processes are inherently iterative because of the 
hierarchical nature of the receptive fields in the visu-
ally sensitive regions of the brain. As visual process-
ing extends beyond area V1, receptive fields become 
simultaneously larger in their spatial scope and more 
complex  in  their  feature  specificity.  Thus,  in  order 
to determine both “what” and “where” in any visual 
stream of processing (be it ventral or dorsal, for exam-
ple) hypotheses must be activated and confirmed; one 
or more cycles of reentry is required to establish a sta-
ble representation (see Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002, for 
a review). From this perspective, it is expected that the 
biases of object updating (Enns et al, in press) should 
apply equally well to tasks performed by a visual sub-
system that can result in conscious perception as well 
by  a  visual  subsystem  that  can  unconsciously  guide 222
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actions based on parameters established prior to the 
appearance of a new object.
Note that this perspective suggests that the object 
updating processes underlying visual backward mask-
ing and masked priming are shared. This could come 
about because both the ventral and the dorsal visual 
streams begin by using the object representations that 
are instantiated through reentrant processing in corti-
cal area V1. These representations can therefore be in-
fluenced by the goals and intentions of the participant, 
even though they are developed prior to the separation 
of further visual processing for the conscious ventral 
stream and the unconscious dorsal stream. This is ad-
mittedly a speculative hypothesis at this time, but we 
believe it accounts for the pattern of data revealed in 
the present study. Future studies will be required to de-
termine if this hypothesis stands up to a priori tests.
The  reentrant  theory  also  provides  a  unique  per-
spective on why the effects of similarity are opposite in 
their direction in the two tasks. Put simply, it is because 
“success” in the two tasks is rewarded by diametrically 
opposed task constraints. Consider first what it means 
to be correct in the masking task, where participants 
try to classify the first display in the face of a visual 
system  inherently  biased  to  update  the  earliest  hy-
potheses activated by the first display with the features 
contained in the second display. “Success” in this task 
means one has been able to undo or “unbind” features 
that have been erroneously grouped together into one 
representation from the two displays. Not surprisingly, 
this should be easiest to do when the features in the 
two displays are most dissimilar, because they contain 
different  feature  values  in  shape,  color,  location,  or 
even temporal characteristics.
“Success” in the priming task, on the other hand, in-
volves responding rapidly to the second display. Thus, 
to the extent that the ubiquitous object updating biases 
of human vision favor an early preparation or initiation 
of the correct response to the second display, success 
in the task will be rewarded (given a head start) by 
similar prime images and punished (delayed) by dis-
similar prime images. From the perspective of the reen-
trant theory, then, the opposite direction of influence of 
image  similarity  in  masking  and  priming  derives  not 
from independent visual processing streams underly-
ing the two tasks (although independent streams may 
indeed be the case), but rather from the requirements 
imposed by the different psychophysical tasks on visual 
representations that are biased to constantly update 
themselves in an effort to provide stable representa-
tions in the support of either conscious perception or 
accurate visually guided action. In a masking task, an 
inadvertently grouped rapid sequence of displays must 
be “unbound”; in a priming task, the same inadvert-
ently “bound” rapid sequence of displays can influence 
perceptual-motor fluency (both positively if similar or 
negatively if dissimilar).
Participants’ goals influence 
conscious and unconscious visual 
processes
The finding that similarity in the task-relevant features 
influenced masking and priming (but not similarity in 
the  task-irrelevant  features)  strongly  suggests  that 
the representations involved in both of these tasks are 
influenced from the earliest stages by the goals of the 
participant. Let us consider the implications of this find-
ing for each task in turn.
The finding that a participant’s goals influence vis-
ual-motor  response  priming  implies  that  unconscious 
processes should not be equated with fixed or invariant 
processes, as is sometimes done. Instead, it points to 
the possibility that even unconscious visual processes 
are  under  the  guidance  and  control  of  the  high-level 
goals of the participant. When this point has been made 
previously in the context of tasks in which the displays 
can also be consciously experienced, as for example, in 
the contingent visual capture effects of Folk, Remington, 
& Johnston (1992), it has been less controversial than 
when similar points have been raised with respect to 
displays that are not consciously experienced (Ansorge 
& Neumann, 2005; Klotz & Neumann, 1999; McCormick, 
1997; Schmidt, 2002). This is likely because, in the folk 
psychology of vision researchers, the concept of “uncon-
scious” has been falsely associated with “zombie”-like 
processes  rather  than  intelligent  ones.  However,  just 
a  moment’s  reflection  will  reveal  that  even  the  most 
intelligent  of  processes  relies  heavily  on  a  myriad  of 
sub-processes that themselves never result in products 
of  consciousness.  Examples  include  the  grammar  of 
spoken language, shape constancy in visual perception, 
and reaching accurately for the handle of a coffee cup 
seen for the first time. So it may be time for researchers 
to abandon the intuitive, but unsupported links in their 
theories between unconscious and “dumb” (a term often 
used as shorthand for simple and invariant). 
Indeed, when we look for other instances of inten-
tions exerting an influence on unconscious visual proc-
esses, there is already a considerable and growing body 
of evidence pointing in this direction. For example, we 
have already mentioned work in our own lab showing 
that interrupted visual search (Lleras et al, in press) 
is influenced strongly by the expectations participants Task relevance in masking and priming
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have about what features they will need to report in a 
psychophysical task. Although this study involves dis-
plays that ultimately result in conscious perceptions, 
the latency of the effects on manual RT are such that 
they occur before the time that participants are able to 
report on the contents of their perceptions. 
Similar  conclusions  have  been  reached  in  the  lit-
erature on the negative compatibility effect in masked 
priming (Lleras & Enns, 2006), where the short latency 
with which the prime influences motor processes (i.e., 
100-200 ms, Verleger et al., 2004) is far below the time 
required for these same displays to result in visible im-
ages. The importance of task relevance has also been 
noted previously in the literature on response priming 
in metacontrast masking, where primes that are not 
visible influence responses to the visible mask, but only 
when their features correspond to the discriminations 
being made with regard to the visible mask (Ansorge & 
Neumann, 2005; Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003) or when 
the likelihood of a match between the prime and the 
mask  features  is  high  (Ansorge,  2004;  Jaśkowski, 
Skalska, & Verleger, 2003). 
Turning to the role of task relevance in conscious 
perception, the finding that participants’ goals directly 
influence the effectiveness of a visual backward mask 
implies that the processes of masking are not accom-
plished in some invariant or pre-attentive stage of visu-
al processing that passes its results on to a later “more 
intelligent” attentive or cognitive stage of processing. 
This has been the basis of quite a few general models 
of perception during the past few decades, including 
the  influential  feature integration  theories of  Neisser 
(1967) and Triesman (1988), and the two-stage mod-
els of rapid serial perception of Raymond, Shapiro, & 
Arnell (1992) and Chun & Potter (1995). But here too, 
there is already a growing body of evidence favoring 
a  more  interactionist  view.  For  example,  earlier  we 
mentioned that participants anticipating change in the 
identity of a face were faster to detect identity changes 
than changes in emotional expression, and that par-
ticipants with the opposite expectation were faster to 
detect changes in emotion (Austen & Enns, 2003). A 
recent report has extended this finding to the detection 
of two target faces in a rapid serial sequence of faces, 
with the result that similar targets are more difficult 
to detect only when their similarity is relevant to the 
features used to classify the faces (Sy & Giesbrecht, 
2006). Stevanovski, Oriet, and Jolicoeur (2002) also 
reported a striking example of task relevance govern-
ing the influence of conscious perception. The percep-
tion of an ambiguous shape was impaired in that study 
by performing an action specific to one interpretation 
of the shape. When “<” was described as a left-point-
ing  arrow,  it  was  identified  less  accurately  during  a 
leftward than a rightward response. When the same 
“<” was described as a right-shining headlight, the op-
posite pattern of accuracy was observed. How partici-
pants intended to encode a shape therefore modulated 
their perception of it. 
Conclusion
Understanding  the  relationship  between  conscious  and 
unconscious  processing  in  vision  poses  a  considerable 
challenge  for  cognitive  scientists.  The  present  findings 
provide two important clues to this relationship. First, the 
finding that the conscious processes of object perception 
indexed in masking studies and the unconscious proc-
esses of action control tapped in priming studies are both 
strongly influenced by the intentions of the participant 
suggests that the early visual representations that guide 
both of these systems have much in common. The hy-
pothesis we offer for further testing in this regard is that 
the reentrant processes we describe as object updating 
(Enns, Lleras & Moore, in press) are used to form the 
early representations that guide both of these systems. 
Second, the finding of a double dissociation between 
masking and priming with regard to the influence of 
display similarity is consistent with the existence of at 
least partially unique neural systems underlying these 
two tasks (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Neumann, 1990) 
even though these systems may each make use of the 
same early visual representations. The hypothesis of-
fered here for the double dissociation is that the pur-
pose of conscious perception in a masking task (i.e., 
to  see  the  first  image  without  interference  from  the 
second image) is in direct conflict with the purpose of 
unconscious  visually  guided  action  in  a  priming  task 
(i.e., to act rapidly on the information in the second 
image).  Specifically,  seeing  the  first  image  requires 
an “unbinding” of information that may already have 
been  perceptually  grouped  when  the  rapid  sequence 
was first processed. On the other hand, acting on the 
basis of the second image will be facilitated by earlier 
processing  of  related  information,  especially  if  that 
information  is  “bound”  in  early  visual  processing  to-
gether with the second image. The challenge we set 
for  future  studies  is  therefore  to  test  whether  these 
speculative hypotheses withstand the scrutiny of future 
experimental data.
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